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Abstract
We study the relationship between gerontocracy and aggregate economic performance in a
simple theoretical model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation and produc-
tive government spending (investments in ICT). We show that gerontocratic e´lites display
the tendency to underinvest in public education and productive government services, thus
being harmful for growth. In absence of inter-generational altruism, the damage caused by
gerontocracy is mainly due to the lack of long-term delayed return on investments, originated
by the shorter life horizon of the elder ruling class. An empirical analysis is carried out to
test theoretical predictions across different countries and different economic sectors. The
econometric results confirm our main hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, per capita income growth rates have ceased to converge across
OECD countries and there has been a surge of academic research and policy attention about
the causes underlying differences in economic growth performance across these countries.
While productivity has accelerated in some of the most emerging economies and, most no-
tably, in the United States, it has substantially slowed down especially in continental Europe
and Japan (OECD [27]). Focusing on Europe, it is easily observed that since the mid-1990s,
the economic performance has experimented a significant contraction compared to earlier
periods. The economic literature developed so far has provided various explanations for such
a sclerosis (Blanchard [8], Gordon [17]). The most commonly cited causes of the slow growth
concern the rigidity of the European economic model, the burden of taxation, the strict de-
pendency of citizens on the welfare system and the evidence that Europe has used some of
the past productivity improvements to increase leisure rather than income. In particular, a
wide consensus has been reached among reserachers regarding the “European model”, which,
despite its successes during the post-war era, is proving to be inadequate now that the eco-
nomic development is increasingly based on innovation and national firms can no longer be
protected from foreign competition. Moreover, several studies point out that the adoption of
important general purpose technologies associated with the Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) revolution has been hindered or impeded in Europe by an excessively
regulated labor market and an insufficient level of competition (van Ark et al.[30]). Despite
this productivity crisis is a common feature of a number of European economies, remarkable
differences emerge from cross country comparisons.1
Most recently, a new strand of the literature has emerged, prospecting the idea that a
large share of the heterogeneity in productivity growth across countries (and within Europe
in particular) could be attributed to the economic and political e´lites’ capacity of managing a
country (Caselli and Morelli [12], Mattozzi and Merlo [24] [?]). Along these lines of thinking,
the e´lites’ responsibilities, with respect to the institutional, social and technological delays
accumulated in the recent past, have become an issue in the European economic panorama.
However, differently from this literature, our claim in this paper is that the e´lites’ respon-
sibility does not exclusively derive from their simple tendency to maintain the status quo.
It is also due to their inability to seize the opportunity given by new technologies and to
implement the best choice for the economy as a whole, a direct consequence of the obsoles-
cence of their personal human capital. Indeed, as pointed out by Messner and Polborn [25],
many political or economic reforms resemble investment projects in their return streams:
initially, there is a cost to be borne, but eventually there will be benefits. In this frame,
young people will be able to enjoy the benefits longer and hence will be more inclined to
favor reforms than older people. It then follows that, among individuals of different ages, the
oldest ones will not be in favor of the change because they mainly suffer the costs without
being able to reap much of the benefits. Therefore we define a gerontocratic society as a
place where the decision-making process and the political environment are dominated by the
1For example, OECD [27] reports that, compared with the previous decade, hourly labor productivity picked
up in a group of economies, including Norway, Portugal, Germany, Finland and Sweden, while remained stable
or reduced in the others.
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oldest individuals, with negative consequences on economic performance in periods of rapid
change and instability, when innovation and flexibility are at a premium.
The inability of an older ruling class in managing innovation is therefore a key feature of
our research. Existing literature on labor economics provides further support in favor of this
idea. Several studies show that a negative link between size and productivity exists and it is
even more pronounced in the ICT sector (See Daveri and Maliranta [15]). Indeed, workforce
aging is known to entail skill deterioration and lessened ability to adapt and learn new things.
One possible explanation relies on the cognitive abilities’ tendency to deteriorate with age.
Although this decline is not uniform across abilities, after a certain age threshold, further
advancements in age are seemingly associated with lower productivity at work. Beyond
that threshold, further increases of experience add little or nothing to the working ability
of a given worker. There are no reasons to believe that power e´lites are excluded from this
process.
Along this line of reasoning, our work is also related to the literature on interest group
politics, where existing powerful interest groups may impede the introduction of new tech-
nologies in order to protect their economic rents (Acemoglu and Robinson [1], Alesina and
Rodrik [2], Fernandez and Rodrik [16]). In these contributions political e´lites block techno-
logical and institutional development because of a political replacement effect. Innovations
often erode e´lites’ incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be re-
placed. Fearing replacement, political e´lites are unwilling to initiate change and may even
block economic development. Moreover, the theoretical model we develop belongs to the
broad literature that studies the links between different political variables and economic
growth (Bellettini et al. [7], Hashimzade and Davis [19], Hopenhayn and Muniagurria [20],
Krusell and Rios-Rull [22], Krusell et al. [23]). In particular, Hashimzade and Davis [19]
provide an interesting example on how political uncertainty might impede economic growth.
The main conclusion of their theoretical work is that an increase in a political instability
produces growth-reducing policies because leads governments to invest less in activities that
support human capital accumulation. Along the same line of reasoning, through a simple
model very close to the one developed by those authors, we argue that gerontocracy, involv-
ing an elder ruling class with a shorter life horizon, determines lower investments in human
capital and in productive public services and thereby depresses economic development.
Therefore, our aim with this paper is to study the relationship between country economic
performances and the age of the political e´lite of a society. Using a simple theoretical
framework, we show that an older ruling class, whose interest may be less devoted to long-
term delayed return on investment, may weaken the human capital accumulation process
because of inadequate public education policies and hinder private sector productivity growth
because of poor expenditure in productive services. In this sense, we argue that gerontocracy
is harmful for growth. To measure the impact of this phenomenon on economic growth, in our
empirical analysis we combine information on socio-economic characteristics and background
of the political e´lites (i.e., the parliamentarians of a group of European countries) along with
information from a rich industry-level data set. Our main goal is to exploit differences in
the politicians’ age across countries to estimate the effect that gerontocracy exerts on the
allocation of public spending on productive investments and thus on economic growth.
The plan of the article is the following. Section 2 lays out the baseline model and discusses
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the links among gerontocracy, public investments and economic growth. Our main conclusion
is that gerontocracy is an important source of innovation-retarding policies and therefore
depresses economic development. Therefore, it can be seen as plausible explanations of the
growth differentials across countries. Section 3 discusses the data. Due to limitations on the
availability of political data, we have not been able to extend the analysis to all EU countries.
The countries involved in our study are Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Germany and UK
that, anyway, represents a large share of the European economy and population. Section 4
presents our empirical analysis, and our focus is to show how the performances recorded by
a group of European countries, whose political structures are often characterized by leaders
who are significantly older than most of the adult population, can be explained once this
peculiarity is recognized. The empirical results are consistent with the model theoretical
predictions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
In this section we present our theoretical model that extends the framework proposed by
Hashimzade and Davis [19] by taking into account the role of public productive service,
along with the public investment in education, as engine of the human capital accumulation.
Demography . In a discrete-time t ∈ {0, 1, . . .∞} economy, a continuum of measure
1 of consumers/workers produces a single homogenous good. At every moment, the same
number of people are born and die, so the population is constant and normalized to one.
Each agent has an uncertain lifetime and faces a probability υ of dying at any date. Following
Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro [9], we model mortality such that the measure of each
generation declines deterministically through time. The unconditional probability for an
agent of reaching age a ∈ [0, a] is defined as:2
υ(a) =
e−̺a − κ
1− κ
with κ > 0, ̺ < 0, or κ ∈ (0, 1), ̺ > 0 (1)
where the maximum age a that an agent can reach is given by:
a =
−log(κ)
̺
(2)
No dynastic concerns are taken into account and people care only about their own utility.
Similar to Glomm and Ravikumar [18], in each period agents allocate their time between
education (e) and production (1− e).
Technology . Production function requires the use of human capital and government
purchases and takes the form:
Yt = AG
η
t [(1− e)Ht]
1−η
(3)
where A > 0 is the constant social marginal return of human capital, (1− e)Ht is the stock
of human capital at time t (i.e. efficiency of labor hour), Gt is the productive government
2Typically, individual mortality does not depend only on the individuals age and hinges also on the own
consumption of health care and on the level of aggregate activity within a health care system. Boucekkine, de la
Croix and Licandro [9] exstensively discuss the survival law defined by equation (1).
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spending (e.g. the provision of productive services, the roll-out and adoption of broadband,
antitrust legislation, etc) available at the beginning of period t and 0 < η < 1.3
Human capital accumulation is determined according to the following production func-
tion:
Ht+1 = Ht + φ(Ht, Et) (4)
where no depreciation is assumed, Et is the public investment in education and φ is the
learning technology described by the following homothetic function:
φ(Ht, Et) = eζH
α
t E
1−α
t (5)
with ζ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Output is taxed at fixed rate τ . This implies that the following
condition, representing the government budget constraint, must hold:
τYt = Gt+Et+R
g = σgtτYt+σetτYt+(1−σgt−σet)τYt with (σgt+σet) ≤ 1 ∀t (6)
where σgt and σet are the share of revenues allocated to finance productive government
spending and public education, respectively. It then follows that the share (1− σgt − σet) is
used to finance expenditure that produces no benefit for the community and it can be seen
as private benefit (or appropriation of tax revenues) enjoyed by the e´lites. Therefore, we call
it government rent (Rgt ). Finally, C
p
t = (1− τ)Yt is consumed by the consumers/workers.
Political environment . We assume that all the politicians in the office belong to
the same generation. This simplification allows to consider each Government as a single
individual of age a ∈ [0, a]. We consider an environment where two governments randomly
alternate in office. To keep matter simple, we follow Hashimzade and Davis [19] in assuming
that the two governments are identical and face the same exogenous probability π of being
voted out and replaced. At each time t the government in charge chooses σgt and σet. At time
zero, political e´lites know their status ǫ0 ∈ {l, w}. When ǫ = l the incumbent government
has lost the election. We assign at this event a positive probability π. At the opposite, with
probability (1− π), ǫ = w and the incumbent government remains in charge. In the former
case (ǫ = l) government receives a retirement rent Rr, while in the latter (ǫ = w) it allocates
again tax revenues between productive government spending, public education and its own
(unproductive) rent.
2.1 The optimization process
Political e´lites’ maximize the following instantaneous return function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βυ(a))
t
[θU(Rgt ) + (1− θ)U(C
p
t )] (7)
where U is the strictly concave twice differentiable instantaneous return function, Rgt =
(1 − σgt − σet)τYt is the government rent, C
p
t is the private consumption, β is the time
discount factor, while E0 denotes the expectation conditional on information available at
date t = 0.4 Finally, it is worth noting that in equation (7) θ can be seen as a measure of
3The public factor in equation (3) is a common external input. That is G is a pure public good.
4Notice that the expectation E is with respect to ǫ and is understood to be conditional on σet and σgt.
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politicians’ “selfishness”, as it defines the weight the government assigns to government rent
and private consumption: the higher is θ, the higher is the degree of “selfishness”. It then
follows that the policy vector is defined by Ψ = {(σg1, σe1), (σg2, σe2), . . . }.
In this environment the controls σg and σe at date t depend only on the current state
H, so that σgt = σg(Ht) and σet = σe(Ht). This implies that any given policy generates a
stochastic law of motion for the state:
Ht+1 = Ξ(Ht, σgt, σet, ǫ)
which will be stationary if σg and σe are stationary.
Following the standard notation used in literature, let denote the variables at time t
and t + 1 as those without and with primes. The functional equation associated to the
maximization problem faced by a government in charge at the beginning of period t is
V (H, ǫ) = max
{σe,σg}∞t=0
{[
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
]
+ βυ(a)E
[
V (H
′
, ǫ
′
)
]}
(8)
s.t
Y = Y = AGη [(1− e)H]
1−η
H0 > 0
H
′
= Ξ (H,σg, σe, ǫ)
C = (1− τ)Y
Rg =
{
(1− σg − σe)τY if ǫ = w
Rr if ǫ = l
(9)
where at time t = 0, H0 is pre-determined, R
g
0 and H1 are chosen, and the uncertainty is
due to the risk of an electoral loss in the subsequent period. Notice that equation (8) holds
for any t ∈ (0,∞). The value function (8) is the present discount value of the incumbent
ruling class evalueted along the optimal program.
As previously mentioned, Rr indicates the retirement rent gained in case of electoral loss.
Since we are focusing on the burden that gerontocracy places on the economic performance,
it seems reasonable to assume that the role played by the retirement rent - whose benefits
can actually be enjoyed over a short period of time - in the political e´lites’ decision process
is negligible. Therefore we assume that Rr is a constant and lower than (1− σg − σe)τY .
The following assumptions are maintained for the remainder of this section.
Assumption 1. Life expectancy declines through time according to (1).
Assumption 2. H ∈ H ⊂ R, (σg + σe) ∈ (0, 1) and E,G ∈ A ⊂ R.
Assumption 3. U : X → R is a strictly increasing, twice continously differentiable and
concave utility function, with U ′(0) =∞ and U ′(∞) = 0.
Assumption 4. Retirement rent Rr = R < (1− σe − σg)τY .
In this model we choose to focus on the optimizing behavior of the political e´lites. There-
fore we postpone to a further extension the modeling of a voting stage and the analysis of
the role that population’s age may exert on the political outcomes and then on the aggregate
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economic performance. In other words, in order to be able to analyze our main question in
a meaningful way, we need to find a link between the age structure of the political e´lites and
the policies implemented. For that reason we focus on a such simple environment. Moreover
we added an aggregate technology that ensures a perpetual growth driven by productive
government services and investment in education. The provision of both government ser-
vices and public education is financed by a tax on income, whose revenues are also used to
finance the e´lites’ unproductive rent Rg. As it will be more clear in the following paragraph,
this assumption is crucial to highlight the trade-off faced by the policy maker and the role of
gerontocracy. Each rational government will choose the amount of tax revenues to invest in
innovation and education that will yield a rent Rg as large as possible, under the uncertainty
of being re-elected in the subsequent election. In this conceptualization, the term υ(a)π
can be interpreted as complement to 1 of the turnover rate, among politicians belonging
to different generations. According to the empirical evidence, this turnover rate raises as
the political e´lite gets older. As it appers clearly from equation (8), the lower is υ(a)π the
higher is the relative weight of the current benefit with respect to the future, making it op-
timal for politicians to raise their private unproductive rent and lower the productive public
investments.
2.2 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Here we are interested into analyzing the long-run effects of gerontocracy. Therefore, we
focus on the stationary equilibrium which involves time-invariant decision rules in the infinite
horizon. This concept uses a recursive representation of the political e´lites’ problem.
Definition 1. Given the initial H0 and Ht ∈ Γ(Ht−1) ⊂ H, with Γ continuous and compact-
valued, a Balaced Growth Path (hereafter BGP) for the economy is a collection of sequences
{H,Y,Cp, Rg, σg, σe, G,E, e}
∞
t=0 such that:
i) H evolves according to (4);
ii) government budget is balanced, τYt = Gt + Et +R
g
t ;
iii) politicians solve problem (8-9).
Let now Vl denote the value of an electoral loss, which occurs with probability π, and Vw
the value of being (re)electeded, which occurs with probability (1 − π). Then the optimal
value function V for the political e´lites’ optimization problem (8-9) is obtained as solution
to the following Bellman equation:
V (H) = max
{σe,σg}∞t=0
[
θU(Rg(H))+(1−θ)U(Cp(H))
]
+βυ(a)
[
πVl(H
′
)+(1−π)Vw(H
′
)
]}
(10)
subject to (9).
With interior equilibrium, the first order conditions and the envelope condition for the
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political e´lites’ problem are respectively:
[FOC]
∂V
∂σg
= 0⇒
∂U
∂σg
+ βυ(a)
[
π
∂Vl
∂H
′
∂H
′
∂σg
+ (1− π)
∂Vw
∂H
′
∂H
′
∂σg
]
= 0 (11)
[FOC]
∂V
∂σe
= 0⇒
∂U
∂σg
+ βυ(a)
[
π
∂Vl
∂H
′
∂H
′
∂σe
+ (1− π)
∂Vw
∂H
′
∂H
′
∂σe
]
= 0 (12)
[ENV ]
∂Vl
∂H
=
∂U(R)
∂H
;
∂Vw
∂H
∂
∂H
[
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
]
(13)
Conditions (11-12-13), togheter with the trasversality condition:
lim
t→∞
(βυ(a))
t ∂U(·)
∂H
Ht = 0 (14)
and the initial condition of the economy fully characterize the solution of the political e´lites’
problem.
Finally, the assumption of identical governments implies that they choose the same opti-
mal level of σe and σg, which is constant along the BGP where all the per capita variables
grow at the same rate given by
γ = ζe
[
A1/(1−η)σeσ
η/(1−η)
g τ (1− e)
]1−α
(15)
Simple algebra provides the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Along the BGP, the growth rate of per capita variables is increasing in the
amount of tax revenues used to finance education and productive services:
∂γ
∂σe
∣∣∣∣
BGP
> 0 and
∂γ
∂σg
∣∣∣∣
BGP
> 0
Proof 1. See appendix A.1.
Recalling that along BGP, H
′
= H(1 + γ), proposition 1 also implies:
∂H
′
∂σe
= H
(
1− α
σe
)
γ (16)
∂H
′
∂σg
= H
(
1− α
1− η
η
σg
)
γ (17)
Finally, in order to obtain explicit solutions for σe and σg and do some comparative
statics, we assume now that the politicians’ preferences are logarithmic. Provided that υ
depends on the politicians’ age according to (1), solving (11-13) with respect σg and σe
yields:
σ∗g = η
βv (1− π) (1− α)
θ + βv (1− π) (1− α)
, (18)
σ∗e = (1− η)
βv (1− π) (1− α)
θ + βv (1− π) (1− α)
. (19)
Proposition 2. Along the BGP, the optimal government spending in productive services σ∗g
and education σ∗e decline when the political e´lite gets older. Thus, the older is the political
e´lite (i.e. the higher is a) the lower is the equilibrium growth rate γ.
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Proof 2. See appendix A.2.
In a simple framework, we showed that politicians’ age is negatively related to their
intentions in favor of adopting potential growth enhancing policies. Our main finding is that
public investments do respond to changes in the ruling class age structure, which affect the
re-election probabilitiy, and therefore size of the unproductive rent enjoyed by the e´lite. We
conclude that the older is the political e´lite, the lower are the public resources devoted to
productive services and education, human capital accumulation declines and the economic
growth slows considerably.
3 The data
The data used in the empirical analysis have been collected from different sources. In what
follows we provide a description of the data and discuss the procedures adopted to merge
data from different sources in a single dataset.
The first source is the DataCube dataset, obtained from the EURELITE network, that
collects information on personal characteristics of national parliamentarians in several Eu-
ropean countries from 1983 to 2004.5 DataCube includes about fifty variables related to
the social and political background of national parlamentarians. Beyond some basic socio-
demographic variables (i.e., occupation, education, age and sex), the dataset includes also
information on politicians’ background, with particular attention to the pre-parliamentary
political experience, including political and administrative appointments at local level (town,
county, and region), parliamentary career (i.e., age at entry into parliament and the number
of elections for which they had stood successfully), leading party functions, and government
appointments. However, our primary focus within this dataset is on two main variables: i)
the average age of the parliament in each country, which represents our measure of gerontoc-
racy, and ii) the percentage of newcomers in each electoral round, which provides a measure
of the political turnover.
The second source is represented by the EU-KLEMS dataset, which contains variables
measuring output, productivity, employment (skilled and unskilled), physical capital, ICT
investments and technological change at industry level, for all European Union member states
from 1970 onwards.6 The availability of data at industry level is extremely important for our
analysis, as we believe that the relationship between the level of gerontocracy, investments
in ICT and economic growth may be quite heterogeneous across the many sectors of the
economy. Industry level data will then be able to capture such heterogeneity better than
aggregate measure, such as the per capita GDP. Moreover, EU-KLEMS provides information
on the public ICT investment, proxied by the ICT investment of the non-market economy
(public administration and education, health and social services).
As the number of countries covered and the time span length of the EU-KLEMS are both
larger than those available in the EURELITE dataset, the merging procedure of these two
5For more information on the EURELITE network see the following web page address:
http://www.eurelite.uni-jena.de/eurelite/portrait/introduction.html.
6For more information on the EU-KLEMS dataset the interested reader can refer to the following web page:
http://www.euklems.net/.
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sources has produced a sample that includes 7 countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, The Netherlands and UK) and 71 industries that we have further re-aggregated
into 6 “macro”sectors (Manufacturing, Electrical machinery and telecommunication, Finance
and business services, Retail and distribution services, Personal and social services, and Non-
market services plus other goods producing industries), with a time span ranging from 1983
to 2004.7
Finally, we have added a variable accounting for public expenditure on education at
country level as provided by EUROSTAT and UNESCO.8 For our purposes, this variable
has been standardized with respect to GDP. However, since we do not have information on
the German public education expenditure before the pre-unification period, in our empirical
analysis we split our sample in two sub-samples. The first sub-sample, made of 2,916
observations, spans the whole period from 1984 up to 2004 and includes data from all country
but Germany. The second sub-sample, made of 1,485 observations, spans the sub-period
from 1995 up to 2004, but includes data from Germany. Finally, we obtain a sub-sample of
control, made of 1,269 observations, that spans the sub-period from 1995 up to 2004, but
do not include Germany.
Table 1 reports all summary statistics. According to our data, only 21% of the national
representatives are female and the average age is about 58 years, with France showing the
oldest parliament and The Netherlands the youngest (see figure 1 for a detailed picture of
the cross country differences in life expectancy and politicians’ age in the sample). About
60% of parliamentarians in the sample has a university degree. Furthermore, about 60% of
them had a previous local/regional background activity in terms of being a representative
elected by citizens and about 60% have been elected in the same place of origin.
Concerning the economic data, we see that workers with average skills account for about
two thirds of total hours worked, with low skilled and high skilled workers that follows. In
particular, high skilled workers account for only 13% of total hours (see table2).
For a better understanding of our data and the relationships among them, we have also
computed unconditional correlation coefficients between gerontocracy and TFP growth and
between ICT (both private and public) and TFP growth. In table 3 the (n,m) cell shows
the average correlation between the TFP growth of industry n and the level of gerontoc-
racy attributed to country m. The general negative impact exerted by gerontocracy is quite
transparent when looking at the last row of the table, which reports the correlation column
average by country. In particular, this detrimental effect seems to be stronger the higher is
the technological complexity of the industry, being larger in the Electrical machinery and
telecommunication sector. Notice that (on average) the older are the politicians the larger
are the negative correlations. As suggested by our theoretical model, a positive correlation
between public ICT and TFP growth should emerge from the data, with the former posi-
tively affecting the latter and being complement with the private ICT. The unconditional
correlation coefficients reported in table 5 seem to confirm our theoretical predictions, with
7We decided to keep the electrical machinery and telecommunication sector separated from the aggregated
manufacturing sector because we believe that in this sector the correlation between investment in ICT and TFP
growth could be particularly relevant.
8Data source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu for the period 1995-2004 and
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/default.aspx for the period 1983-1994.
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public ICT and TFP strongly correlated, and with public and private investments in ICT
being complement (see figure 2 where we plot the (log of) public and private ICT). Finally,
in table 6 we observe the correlation between private ICT and TFP. Even in this case the
positive correlation seems to hold and it is stronger in those sectors where we expect ICT to
be a major driver for TFP.
Finally, a different picture emerges if we look at the correlation between the (log of
the) age of the newcomers in each national Parliament and the TFP growth. The results
reported in table 4 suggest that the problem is not the politicians’ age sic et simpliciter.
In comparison with the previous table, correlations are much more tenuous and, often, are
positive. A possible explanation could be that older newcomers, during their working life
(presumably in the private sector), have acquired skills and competences that (partially or
completely) compensate the human capital obsolescence due to aging.
4 The empirical model
In this section we present the empirical strategy used to test the main hypothesis of our
theoretical model, namely that gerontocracy negatively affects economic growth due to its
incapacity to provide sufficient investments in innovation (public and private) and education.
However, as we lack adequate information on education expenditure, we limit the empirical
analysis to the study of the effect of gerontocracy on innovation, thus assuming that the level
of expenditure in education is given.9 Therefore, our empirical model will be specified to
estimate the impact of gerontocracy on public productive investments and, only indirectly,
on the TFP growth. In a more formal way, the model can be formalized using the following
reduced form three equation system:
log(tfpijt) = α0 + α1log(pexpedu)jt + α2log(ict)ijt−1 + α3log(gict)jt−1 + (20)
+α4du95 + α5du95 · log(ict)ijt−1 + α6Sijt−1 + α7Xjt + ηijt
log(ictijt) = β0 + β1log(pexpedu)jt + β2log(gict)jt + β3Sijt + (21)
+β4Xjt + εijt
9Unfortunately, homogeneous and comparable data on education expenditure at country level is available
only in aggregate, thus preventing us from distinguishing expenditures at different levels of education. In fact,
we expect that expenditure at lower levels of education, although important for the economic growth, may be
positively related with gerontocracy that, in fact, could be aligned with vested interests of teacher unions for
preserving a status quo where insiders obtain all the benefits, without caring about quality. On the contrary,
the financing of higher education and research activities may be much less correlated with gerontocracy as it
usually leads to breakthroughs and innovations that are not in line with the idea of maintaining the status quo
of a gerontocratic system. Based on simple descriptive statistics, our data do not show any correlation between
gerontocracy and public expenditure on education.
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log(gictijt) = γ0 + γ1log(pexpedu)jt + γ2log(gerontocracy)jt−1 + (22)
+γ3log(newcomers)jt−1 + γ4local1jt−1 + γ5local2jt−1 +
+γ6rootsit−1 + γ7backgroundit−1 + γ8log(education)jt−1 +
+γ9Sijt + γ10Xjt + ξijt
where i is the sector, j is the country and t is time, and where tfpijt is the TFP growth
index, log(ict)ijt is the logarithm of the private ICT capital service, while log(gict)jt is the
logarithm of the public ICT capital service. Furthermore, Sijt is a vector of sector-specific
variables (share of labor input with different skilld and share of workers with different age)
and Xjt is a vectors of other controls at country level, such as market openness and country
dummies. Following the empirical evidence reported in van Ark et al. [30] and Dahl et
al. [14], we include in our TFP equation the dummy variable (du95) and its interaction
with ict to captures a structural break that could have changed the productivity trend from
1995 onward. All other listed variables are self-explanatory. Finally, to avoid potential
endogeneity problems, whenever reasonable regressors have been lagged one period.
Given our system of equations 21 and 22, we can easily see that gerontocracy affects
private ICT only through the public ICT (gict). At the same time, gerontocracy affects
TFP through both the private and public ICT (equations 21 and 22). Therefore, the total
effect of gerontocracy on TFP is given by
∂TFP
∂gerontocracy
= (α3γ2) + (α2 + α5du95)β2γ2
where the first term on the right side of the equation reflects the (direct) effect of gerontocracy
on TFP through the public ICT investment and the second term is the (indirect) effect
through the private ICT investment.
As we assume a recursive structure for our empirical model, the parameters have been
estimated using SUR technique (Zellner [31], Zellner and Huang [32] and Zellner [33]). In
what follows, we start presenting the results obtained pooling all countries and sectors and
later we discuss the results obtained fitting our model by sector or by country.
5 The empirical results
In this section we present and comment the empirical results. We first discuss the results
obtained with the pooled data (all sectors and countries) and then introduce and compare
the results by sector and country. Finally, we present some robustness check analyses that
should help reinforce the conclusion of our study. All analyses have been carried out using
the three different samples discussed in section 3.
5.1 Estimates from the pooled data
Table 7 presents the estimates of the parameters in equations (20-22) for the pooled data,
using the three samples. Overall, the results clearly corroborate our theoretical predictions,
with the gerontocracy variable that negatively affects public ICT, that in turn affects TFP.
This result is robust across sub-samples. Furthermore, and coherently with our theoretical
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predictions, gerontocracy affects TFP mainly through the public ICT investment channel.
In fact, as can be seen in the top panel of table 8, using the pooled data a 1% increase in
the level of gerontocracy affects TFP level by -0.339% or -0.748%, depending on the sample
employed. By disentangling the total effect into its direct and indirect components, we note
that the direct effect is what really drives the result. Finally, by comparing the different
samples we notice also that the negative effect of gerontocracy has increased over time (by
comparing the sample 1 across the two periods) and it seems to have an important effect in
Germany (by comparing sample 1 and sample 2 across the same period).
Consistently with the idea that the attitude to innovate declines with the politicians’
age, from table 7 we see that past experience of political government at local/regional level
(background) seems to be negatively related with gict. In particular, background affects
negatively and significantly the TFP growth index in sub sample 2 (with elasticity equal to
-0.650 respectively), when the role of public ICT capital is crucial, while plays an irrelevant
role in the first sub sample (with elasticity 0.016), when the impact of gict on TFP is relatively
smaller. This may be partly explained by thinking that being elected to national parliament
can be seen as the culmination of a political carreer spent largerly at local or regional level.
Under this perspective, background proxies politicians’age and therefore the same argument
used for gerontocracy can be applied to explain its effect on productive public spending.
Our estimates document also a switch occurred in 1994 from private to public ICT capital
as a main determinant of the TFP growth index. In fact, although the parameter of gict is
positive and significant in both samples, it is definitely greater after 1994. On the contrary,
the contribution of the private ICT is positive and not significant when the time horizon is
longer, while it is negative and significant when we focus on the last decade of our dataset,
irrespective of the presence of Germany in the dataset. This result is consistent with the
literature on TFP growth in the European countries. In fact, along a time span similar to
the one taken into account in the present analysis, Van Ark et al.[30] show that the effect of
private ICT on TFP growth for the continental European countries is zero up to the mid-
1980s, significantly negative until the 1991-1996 period and again zero after that, leading the
authors to conclude that ICT has at best had no effect on TFP index.
Estimates document also the complementarity between ICT (public and private) capital
and non-ICT capital (nict), which enters in the TFP equation with a negative and significant
parameter in two of the three samples employed. Furthermore, they show that over the whole
period the TFP growth index increases with the share of medium skilled workers (hhms),
while all employees contribute to the investment in private and public ICT (with some
differences). On the contrary, when we consider the shorter samples, high skilled workers
never play a role.
Similarly to what happens in the political arena, our estimates suggest also that age
affects the contribution of the workforce (i.e. the labor productivity) to the TFP and private
ICT, given that the parameter associated to younger ages ( h29 and h49) is generally greater
than the one associated to h+50. The worker age does not seem to have an effect on the
public ICT equation.
Finally, looking at education (the second channel through which gerontocracy may affect
economic performance according to our theoretical model), our results do not support the
idea that public expenditure on education - whose limits we have previously described -
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unambigously enhance TFP. Regressions ran with alternative aggregate measure (i.e. the
share on the TPE) confirm that, regardless the proxy employed, the final impact of pexpedu
on TFP growth is rather inconclusive.
5.2 Estimates using data by sector and countries
The results presented so far, although interesting, provide only an aggregate picture of
the relationship between gerontocracy, ICT and TFP. However, we know that it can be
highly heterogeneous across the many sectors of the economy and/or by country. As already
discussed in the previous sections, some of the relationship between ICT and TFP may be
stronger or weaker depending on the specific sector/country where they apply. Therefore, in
what follow we first present elasticity results obtained splitting our pooled samples by sector
and later we comment on the results by country.10
Table 8 provides the elasicities of TFP growth with respect to gerontocracy by sector.
The main result that emerges looking across the sectors is that the more ITC intensive is the
sector, the stronger is the total effect exerted by gerontocacry on TFP growth. In particular
“Electrical machinery and TC”and “Manufacturing”have been characterized by the higher
direct effect via gict (with significant elasticities in the range from -0.385 up to -0.962).
Second, consistently with estimates of the pooled regressions, the elasticities estimated in
the sub sample 2 have been generally higher than the ones referred to sub sample 1: in
particular we find high and significant elasticities in “Finance and business services”(-0.602)
and in “Personal and social services”(-0.711).
Finally elasticities computed by country, reported in table 9, show that the loss in terms of
TFP growth has been particularly relevant in Germany (7.741), Italy (-3.227) and Netherland
(-1.134) but even dramatic in Finland, where the estimated elasticity has been greater than
24%.
5.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of our results to different model specifications, in this section
we briefly present all the alternatives we have estimated and compare the results with our
baseline specifications presented in the previous subsection. As our results seem to be very
robust to alternative specifications, for sake of brevity we do not present all the parameter
estimates. However, they are available upon request by authors.
Our first robustness check has been devoted to analyze the effect on the estimates of
the inclusion of the gerontocracy variables as regressors in the private ICT equation (Eq.
21). In fact, although according to our theoretical model the set of gerontocracy related
variables should not affect private ICT, we have run a model specification that includes
them. Results have shown that these variables are never statistically significant and, in any
case, the magnitude of the parameter estimates has always been very low across samples,
sectors and countries.
We have further checked if alternative specifications, involving gerontocracy variable in-
teractions and politicians’ background variables could have had an effect on the overall
10The full set of parameter estimates by sector and country are available upon request by authors.
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results. According to our results, adding these interactions produces slightly less accurate
estimates, but the main results do not change significantly with respect to those reported
in the previous section. This effect has been noticed in particular in the estimates by sector
and by country, and in our view this should simply reflect a problem of efficiency (due to
small sample size in presence of an increased number of parameters to be estimated).
As a further robustness check we have also estimated a model in which the lagged loga-
rithm of private ICT enters as regressor in the gict equation. While the overall results and
economic conclusions do not change, it is interesting to note that with this new specification
there is a strong feedback effect between ict and gict, self reinforcing each other. No change
is observed in terms of gerontocracy effect on TFP.
We have also adjusted gerontocracy and newcomers (which are computed as country
mean age of the politicians in the office and country mean age of the newcomers) for country
specific life expectancy, in order to account for different interpretations of gerontocracy
according to country specific social norms imposed by different country average age. All
results are fully confirmed in terms of sign, magnitude and significance.
Finally, as our education variable does not produce convincing results, we have estimated
our model using a measure of education expenditure obtained as ratio to Total Public Expen-
diture (TPE) rather than to GDP. Even in this case, education appears to affect private and
public ICT not in an unambiguous way, while the results in terms of gerontocracy remain
perfectly in line with those presented in the previous section.
6 Concluions
In this paper we argue that when relatively young people cease to be the engine of an economy,
long-run economic growth is endangered. Over the last three decades, many European
economies have fallen into an old-age trap, a self-reinforcing mechanism whereby e´lites,
generally the most aged individuals, have used control of the political system to exclude new
generations, who are reasonably the most dynamic and innovative part of the population,
from the access to power.
While we do not analyze this mechanism formally (i.e. we do not explain what are the
determinants of gerontocracy), nor we do focus on some possible “positive”consequences that
gerontocracy may have on a society as a whole, for example in reducing the inequalities, we
focus our effort to explore the possible linkages between the age of the ruling class and the
long-run growth rates both theoretically and empirically.
To achieve this goal, we have developed a simple endogenous growth model where long-
run growth rate is directly affected by public productive services and public investment on
education. The main testable hypothesis coming out from our theoretical model is that
the older is the ruling class the lower is the public investment in education and productive
services.
The empirical analysis corroborates these findings. Estimates indicates that, on average, a
decrease of gerontocracy increases unambiguously the TFP, with elasticities ranging between
-0.339% or and -0.748%, depending on the sample employed. Furthermore, we find that the
direct effect of gerontocracy (via gict) is higher than the indirect one (via ict) and this result
holds using both the pooled data or the data by country and sector. Also, the negative effect
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of gerontocracy on TFP growth is stronger in those sectors such as the electrical machinery
and telecommunication where we expect the ICT to play an important role. Finally, this
effect result larger in Finland, Germany and Italy compared to the other European countries
included in our sample.
Finally, in terms of our future agenda, there are several extensions to our approach that
are worth pursuing. In the theoretical model for instance, we introduce several assumptions
aimed at obtaining an analytical friendly framework. The next step will be to test how
robust these results are when these simplifications are relaxed. In particular, we plan to
address in a subsequent work the formal attempt to endogenize the gerontocracy. Moreover,
from an empirical standpoint we delegate to a further paper the extension of our data set in
order to include information on the managers employed in the private sector.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Along the BGP:
Yt+1 − Yt
Yt
∣∣∣∣
BGP
≡ γ =
[
A (τσgA)
η
1−η (1− e)
η
1−η
]
(Ht+1 −Ht)− 1 (23)
Recalling that Et = σ
eτYt and Gt = σgτYt, we obtain:
γ = eζ
[
τσeA
1
1−η (τσg(1− e)
η)
η
1−η
]1−α
Differrentiating γ w.r.t. σe and σg yields:
∂γ
∂σe
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)
η
)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α)
σe
> 0 (24)
∂γ
∂σg
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)
η
)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α) η
(1− η)σg
> 0 (25)
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
σ∗g
da
=
dσ∗g
dv
dv
da
= η
β (1− π) (1− α)
[θ + βv (1− π) (1− α)]
2
dv
da
< 0
σ∗e
da
=
dσ∗e
dv
dv
da
= (1− η)
β (1− π) (1− α)
[θ + βv (1− π) (1− α)]
2
dv
da
< 0
because of assumption (A.2) which implies that v′ (a) < 0.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Definition Sample 1 - 1983:2004 Sample 2 - 1995:2004 Sample 3 - 1995:2004
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
background % of politicians with local/regional political background 60.27 17.71 59.33 15.50 60.19 16.55
female % of female politicians 20.54 12.11 24.72 11.12 23.80 11.78
gerontocracy politicians’ mean age 48.32 1.92 48.74 1.99 44.58 2.11
newcomers newcomers’ mean age 43.63 3.03 44.60 2.59 44.65 2.78
hhs hours worked by high-skilled workers (% of total hours) 10.37 9.47 11.38 9.72 12.21 10.18
hms hours worked by medium-skilled workers (% of total hours) 64.17 17.39 67.70 14.70 68.13 15.68
hls hours worked by low-skilled workers (% of total hours) 25.45 16.52 21.02 13.01 19.66 13.40
h29 hours worked by persons engaged aged 15-29 (% total hours) 27.63 7.82 24.44 7.26 24.92 7.60
h49 hours worked by persons engaged aged 29-49 (% total hours) 53.99 7.83 55.58 7.27 55.28 7.61
h+50 hours worked by persons engaged aged 50 and over (% total hours) 18.38 6.40 19.98 6.72 19.80 7.00
tfp TFP (value added based) growth, 1995=100 100.00 57.10 104.84 17.76 104.63 17.21
gos gross operating surplus 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.11
ict ICT capital services, volume indices, 1995 = 100 117.59 105.52 191.08 109.90 197.89 114.84
nict non ICT capital services, volume indices, 1995 = 100 98.41 18.39 109.22 16.21 110.08 16.63
gict public ICT capital services, volume indices, 1995 = 100 111.63 86.38 176.29 79.68 185.31 82.59
tax taxes (minus subsidies on production) over gross output 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
marketopenness exports/gdp (constant US$) 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.37 0.14
log(pexpedu)gdp public expenditure on education as a % of GDP 5.80 1.00 5.66 1.25 5.85 1.26
observations 2916 1485 1269
Note: Sample 1 refers to the period 1983-2004 and it includes only DNK, FIN, FRA, ITA, NLD and UK; Sample 2 includes all countries, but it spans a shorter period from 1995 to 2004. Finally, Sample 3
contains data from all the countries included in Sample 1 but with respect the sub-period period 1995-2004.
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Table 2: Hours worked by person engaged: by sector, 1983-2004
Sector High skilled Medium skilled Low skilled
1 10.03 % 66.64 % 23.33 %
2 8.51 % 63.16 % 28.33 %
3 23.19 % 62.49 % 14.35 %
4 6.51 % 67.51 % 25.98 %
5 12.18 % 62.04 % 25.78 %
6 9.13 % 64.83 % 26.04 %
avg 11.59 % 64.44 % 23.97 %
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal
and social services, 6 - Non-market services + other goods producing industries.
Table 3: Correlation between TFP growth index and Gerontocracy, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 -0.521 0.129 -0.179 -0.645 -0.444 -0.741 -0.635 -0.434
2 0.034 0.146 -0.101 -0.537 -0.606 -0.565 -0.503 -0.305
3 -0.109 0.007 0.197 0.108 0.146 0.473 0.427 0.178
4 -0.083 0.239 -0.040 -0.609 -0.617 -0.643 -0.637 -0.341
5 0.648 -0.035 0.065 0.515 0.348 0.295 0.479 0.331
6 -0.281 0.128 0.038 -0.491 -0.013 -0.022 -0.454 -0.157
Avg -0.052 0.102 -0.003 -0.277 -0.198 -0.201 -0.220 -0.121
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal
and social services, 6 - Non-market services + other goods producing industries.
Table 4: Correlation between TFP growth index and Newcomers, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 -0.230 -0.195 0.450 -0.825 -0.404 0.292 0.442 -0.067
2 0.061 -0.067 0.235 -0.586 -0.578 0.467 0.454 -0.002
3 -0.022 0.019 -0.305 0.597 0.169 -0.572 -0.470 -0.084
4 -0.051 -0.012 0.259 -0.552 -0.574 0.309 0.472 -0.021
5 0.369 -0.100 -0.261 0.681 0.543 -0.558 -0.284 0.056
6 -0.092 -0.027 -0.111 -0.622 0.055 0.170 0.342 -0.041
Avg 0.006 -0.064 0.045 -0.218 -0.131 0.018 0.159 -0.026
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal
and social services, 6 - Non-market services + other goods producing industries.
A.3 Data definitions and sources
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Table 5: Correlation between TFP growth index and Public ICT, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 0.911 0.878 0.966 0.908 0.693 0.759 0.931 0.864
2 0.014 0.818 0.535 0.693 0.671 0.672 0.462 0.552
3 0.306 0.127 -0.829 -0.160 -0.147 -0.684 -0.202 -0.227
4 0.091 0.671 0.328 0.823 0.613 0.638 0.741 0.558
5 -0.907 0.068 -0.494 -0.727 -0.719 -0.491 -0.837 -0.587
6 0.619 0.723 -0.266 0.694 0.070 0.114 0.758 0.387
avg 0.172 0.547 0.040 0.372 0.197 0.168 0.309 0.258
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal
and social services, 6 - Non-market services + other goods producing industries.
Table 6: Correlation between TFP growth index and Private ICT, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK Avg
sector
1 0.912 0.881 0.781 0.729 0.619 0.663 0.953 0.791
2 0.017 0.654 0.558 0.625 0.287 0.594 0.509 0.463
3 0.167 -0.157 -0.892 -0.298 -0.084 -0.737 -0.229 -0.319
4 0.120 0.714 0.200 0.744 0.568 0.629 0.763 0.534
5 -0.902 0.259 -0.780 -0.740 0.501 -0.574 -0.861 -0.442
6 0.479 0.772 -0.098 0.347 0.281 0.118 0.478 0.340
avg 0.132 0.521 -0.038 0.235 0.362 0.116 0.269 0.228
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal
and social services, 6 - Non-market services + other goods producing industries.
Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth & Politicians’ mean age, our sample
Source: our calculations based on EURELITE data
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Table 7: Parameter estimates: pooled data
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 Sample 2 - 1995:2004 Sample 3 - 1995:2004
log(tfp) log(ict) log(gict) log(tfp) log(ict) log(gict) log(tfp) log(ict) log(gict)
log(hhs)t−1 0.0123 0.0317** 0.0524*** 0.0040 0.0109 0.0065 0.0153 -0.0120 0.00330
log(hms)t−1 0.135*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 0.0856** 0.0134 0.0378* 0.0544 0.0812 -0.000403
log(hls)t−1 -0.0112 0.0739*** 0.131*** 0.0264** 0.0117 -0.0055 0.0294** 0.00366 0.00756
log(h29)t−1 0.1393*** 0.196*** -0.167*** 0.0975*** 0.206*** 0.0151 0.112*** 0.162** -0.00295
log(h49)t−1 0.2074*** 0.311*** -0.313*** 0.371*** 0.310** -0.0159 0.356*** 0.320** 0.00908
log(h50+)t−1 0.0784*** 0.0302 -0.126*** 0.0221 0.122** 0.0469*** 0.0399 0.0930 0.00338
log(gerontocracy)t−1 -4.5578*** -5.0014*** -3.294***
log(newcomers)t−1 0.9068*** 0.6866*** 0.386***
log(background)t−1 0.1963*** -0.4346*** -0.855***
log(female)t−1 0.0123 0.0290* 0.0275*
pexpedut−1 -0.0211** 0.0229 0.184*** -0.0633*** -0.0692* -0.0040 -0.0623*** -0.0786** 0.00332
log(ict)t−1 0.0104 -0.0720*** -0.0580***
du95 0.0178***
du95 · log(ict)t−1 -0.0083**
log(nict)t−1 -0.0981*** 0.287*** -0.0744** 0.702*** -0.0452 0.601***
log(gict)t−1 0.0783*** 0.606*** 0.196*** 0.647*** 0.183*** 0.714***
gost−1 0.2194*** 0.169** 0.287*** -0.0969 0.307*** -0.190*
log(marketopeness)t−1 0.2020*** 0.0623 -0.0511
trend 0.0468*** 0.118*** 0.0309*** 0.110*** 0.0217** 0.121***
constant 2.9171*** -95.96*** -218.8*** 2.437*** -64.89*** -196.7*** 2.200*** -46.41** -221.5***
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 2,803 2,803 2,803 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,144 1,144 1,144
R − squared 0.150 0.831 0.929 0.161 0.685 0.967 0.156 0.685 0.979
Note: Sample 1 includes DNK, FIN, FRA, ITA, NLD and UK from 1983 to 2004. In sample 2 we add GER but limit the time period from 1995 to 2004.
Sample 3 includes countries of Sample 1 but spans from 1995 to 2004. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
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Table 8: Elasticities of the effect of Gerontocracy on TFP growth: pooled data and by sector
Sample Direct effect via gict Indirect effect via ict Total effect
Pooled data (2,803 obs., 1,144 obs., 1,336 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1984:2004 -0.333*** -0.005 -0.339***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.602*** 0.136*** -0.465***
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.981*** 0.233*** -0.748***
Electrical machinery and TC (249 obs., 96 obs., 112 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1984:2004 -0.570*** 0.002 -0.568***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.385 -0.156 -0.541**
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.962*** -0.077 -1.040***
Manufacturing (1,290 obs., 480 obs., 560 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.490*** 0.105 -0.385***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.392*** 0.105 -0.288***
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.490*** 0.105 -0.385***
Finance and business services (238 obs., 88 obs., 104 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.285** 0.069* - 0.216*
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.154 0.088 - 0.242
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.577** -0.024 -0.602**
Retail services (468 obs., 192 obs., 224 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.340*** -0.024 -0.364***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.208 -0.039 -0.168
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.090 -0.019 -0.109
Personal and social service (258 obs., 96 obs., 112 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.142** 0.001 -0.141**
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.384*** -0.072 -0.457***
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.592*** -0.119 -0.711***
Note: Sample 1 includes DNK, FIN, FRA, ITA, NLD and UK from 1983 to 2004. In Sample 2 we add GER but limit
the time period from 1995 to 2004. Sample 3 includes countries of Sample 1 but spans from 1995 to 2004.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
Table 9: Elasticities of the effect of Gerontocracy on TFP: by country
Country Sample Obs. Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
via gict via ict
Denmark Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 -0.216 0.033 -0.182
Finland Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 -21.044*** -3.198 -24.124***
France Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 0.011 0.010 0.021
Germanya Sample 2 - 1995:2004 216 -7.260** -0.482 -7.741**
Italy Sample 1 - 1983:2004 415 -3.246*** 0.019 -3.227***
Netherland Sample 1 - 1983:2004 468 -1.989*** 0.855*** -1.134***
UK Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 0.203*** 0.003 -0.201***
a Due to constancy over time, some variables referred to politician characteristics have not been included as controls in the TFP equation
for Germany and, therefore, it is slightly different from those of other countries.
Note: *** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
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Table 10: Data definitions and sources
Variables Source
Gerontocracy related variables
log(gerontocracy) = log of the politicians’ mean age EURELITE
log(newcomers) = log of the newcomers’ mean age EURELITE
background = % of politicians with local/national political backbround EURELITE
female = % of female politicians EURELITE
Growth accounting variables
tfp = TFP (value added based) growth (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(ict) = log of ICT capital services (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(nict) = log of non-ICT capital services (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(gict) = log of non-market + other goods industries ICT capital services (1995=100) our calculation
on EU-KLEMS
log(hhs) = log of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(hms) = log of hours worked by medium-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(hls) = log of hours worked by low-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
loh(h29) = log of hours worked by persons engaged aged 15-29 (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(h49) = log hours worked by persons engaged aged 29-49 (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(h+50) = log of hours worked by persons engaged aged 50 and over (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
tax = taxes minus subsidies on production/gross output EU-KLEMS
gos = Gross operating surplus (in millions of local currency) EU-KLEMS
log(marketopenness)= log of exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP PWT 6.1
Education variables
pexpedupe= public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure EUROSTAT
pexpedugdp= public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP EUROSTAT
Figure 2: Private and public ICT
Source: our calculations
25
